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THE SPRING HAS SPRUNG: THE FATE OF PLANT
RELOCATION AS A MANDATORY SUBJECT OF
BARGAINING
Many commentators had expected the Milwaukee Spring cases to
resolve the issue of plant relocation in labor-management rela-
tions. However, the cases offered no definitive answer, taking di-
vergent approaches and ultimately focusing on boilerplate contract
clauses. This Comment contends that the NLRB and courts
should refocus their analysis on whether plant relocation is a
mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining and deemphasize
boilerplate waivers. The Comment concludes that the balancing
test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in First Na-
tional Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, should be applied to deter-
mine mandatoriness. This approach would achieve relative consis-
tency, encourage bargaining, maintain flexibility and avoid
instability due to changes in political and economic conditions.
INTRODUCTION
The labor-management relationship is of course affected by ex-
isting economic conditions; and economic conditions of the last dec-
ade have applied new pressures on this relationship. As the national
economy has shifted from its former industrial base, employers are
seeking new ways to remain economically viable. A great number of
plant relocations have occurred causing visible economic and socio-
logical ramifications.'
The stakes are high on both sides of the employer-employee equa-
tion. Relocation and job security have become crucial issues for em-
ployees faced with the threat of a large-scale industry exodus to
cheaper, nonunion foreign markets.' Alternatively, employers wish to
1. Over 6500 plants closed in the period from 1969-1976. Fifteen million jobs
were lost by American workers. Foreign investment increased from 11.8 billion dollars in
1950 to 150 billion dollars in 1979. A ripple effect often accompanies plant closure, lead-
ing to the bankruptcy of many secondary businesses. These facts lead not only to eco-
nomic loss, but also to sociological harm. Job loss contributes to high depression, in-
creased divorce, child and spousal abuse and alcoholism. The suicide rate among
terminated employees is 30 times higher than the average. Kay & Griffin, Plant Clo-
sures: Assessing the Victim's Remedies, 19 WILLAMMTE L. REV. 199, 201-04 (1983).
2. The 1985 Chrysler strike involved the inability of the two sides to agree over
job security provisions. The strike ended quickly, with the establishment of a 170 million
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maximize managerial discretion, maintaining well-settled rights to
close businesses and make inherently managerial decisions. 3 The
threat of relocation is responsible for an increasing number of dis-
putes concerning mid-contract concessions, especially wage de-
creases, work subcontracting, and plant relocation.4
Bargaining over plant relocation is a crucial issue for unions; the
survival of the bargaining unit5 may depend upon whether the deci-
sion is shared by labor and management, or is held solely by man-
agement. Absent the ability to impose express language into a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, employees may have no meaningful way
to stop relocation. A mandatory duty to bargain over plant relocation
might retard the flight of industries. In First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB,6 the United States Supreme Court recognized that
subcontracting is included within the range of mandatory bargaining
subjects. Although the Court expressed no opinion regarding plant
relocation, its approach breathed life into the concept that
mandatory subjects of bargaining should be expanded to protect
labor.
7
Courts have left open the issue of whether plant relocation is a
mandatory subject. Judicial reluctance to resolve the issue may sug-
gest more than conservatism. It may be a judicial acknowledgement
that decisional bargaining will never be a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining and that other avenues exist to resolve plant relocation dis-
putes. Philosophically, this reflects a shift away from a traditional
labor policy favoring intervention on behalf of the weaker party, and
instead emphasizes deference to the relative strengths of the con-
tracting parties.8
dollar job security "bank," whose purpose was to protect workers from loss of work due
to subcontracting or work relocation. However, it could be a Pyrrhic victory. Lee A.
Iacocca, Chief Executive Officer of Chrysler, expressed disappointment with the contract
and warned that despite record profits, the expensive new labor agreement might cause
the company to buy even more cars and parts overseas. L.A. Times, Oct. 28, 1985, § 4,
at 1, col. 5.
3. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
4. Comment, Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring Company:
Work Relocation as a Means to Obtain Midterm Contract Concessions, 33 CATH. U.L.
REV. 1001 (1984).
5. A bargaining unit is a group of employees with a sufficient communality of
interests to constitute a unit appropriate for bargaining purposes. In general, the follow-
ing criteria will be used in order to determine an appropriate unit: functional coherence,
mutuality of interest, collective bargaining history, and employee desires. H. ROBERT,
ROBERT'S DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 37-38 (1966).
6. 452 U.S. 666 (1981). For a discussion of First National Maintenance, see
Gould, The Burger Court and Labor Law: The Beat Goes On - Marcato, 24 SAN DI-
EGO L. REV. 51 (1987), in this issue.
7. Compare Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
However, current law suggests a move away from further expansion of mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
8. See generally Irving, Plant Relocation and Transfers of Work: The NLRB's
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After briefly examining the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)9 and the impact of characterizing plant relocation decisions
as a mandatory subject of bargaining, this Comment focuses upon
the recent Milwaukee Spring"0 line of cases and their lack of a de-
finitive solution to the problem.11 Finally, the Comment will address
the significance of the outcome of the plant relocation issue for fu-
ture labor policy, and conclude that the NLRB and the courts
should apply the First National Maintenance test to plant relocation
disputes.
BACKGROUND
The labor-management relationship is a tumultuous one, much of
which is statutorily enforced by the NLRA. The duty to bargain is
specifically addressed in NLRA sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d).1 2 The leg-
islative history of section 8(a)(5) evidences the importance of collec-
tive bargainings as a means to promote industrial peace by taking
the conflict from the picket line to the bargaining table. The NLRA
mandates that an employer bargain with a labor representative re-
garding wages, hours, and working conditions.1 4 It gives guidance
about the spirit of bargaining, but provides little guidance as to the
scope of the employer's obligation to bargain, particularly about
working conditions.1 5 This vagueness gave rise to the 1947 amend-
'Inherently Destructive' Approach, 34 LAB. L.J. 549 (1983).
9. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982)
[hereinafter NLRA].
10. See infra notes 72-108 and accompanying text.
11. A number of articles have been written addressing this problem. See, e.g.,
Glenn, To Bargain or Not To Bargain: A New Chapter in Work Relations, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 668 (1985).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
13. See Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House - Can an Old Board Learn New
Tricks?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1987), in this issue. The definition of collective bar-
gaining is covered by sections 9, 8(d), and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. A collective bargaining
agreement is a contract or mutual understanding between a union and an employer. The
union is represented by its designated exclusive representative who represents the major-
ity of the employees in respect to wage, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. The parties must meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith. This obliga-
tion does not require either party to agree or concede. The agreement sets forth the terms
and conditions of employment including wages, hours, seniority, vacation pay, bargaining
units, grievance procedures, and other working conditions. See H. ROBERT, supra note 5,
at 14.
14. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
15. The duty to bargain was "something more than the mere meeting of an em-
ployer with the representatives of his employees;" the employer must have "an open mind
and sincere desire to reach an agreement" and "a sincere effort must be made to reach a
common ground." Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1401,
ments to the NLRA, better known as the Taft-Hartley Act,16 in
which Congress attempted to define more clearly the obligations of
bargaining. Nonetheless, Congress rejected a proposal to limit bar-
gaining to five specified topics; instead, Congress chose broader and
more flexible language.17
The legislative history of section 8(a)(5) and 8(d) reflects a con-
gressional desire to create a flexible standard capable of adjusting to
future, unknown industrial requirements,"" and to accommodate in-
dustrial differences. This flexibility, however, has been used instead
as an economic weapon for the dominant party. 9 Indeed, Congress
specifically left the interpretation of the NLRA to the National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB).20 The NLRA intended that the Board
give form to the Act and mold a national labor policy through care-
ful attention to the controversies brought before them by the Board's
General Counsel. Nonetheless, like most administrative rulings, the
Board's rulings require judicial enforcement.2 Thus, the judiciary is
provided with an important role in forming national labor policy.
The Nature of Bargaining Subjects
The crux of the controversy concerns identifying those issues
about which the parties must bargain. That, in turn, depends upon
whether a subject is designated as "mandatory" or "permissive. 2
1414 (1958) (quoting in part from NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874,
885 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941)).
16. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 141
(1982) [hereinafter LMRA].
17. The House bill, as introduced, specified the five topics: (i) wages, rates, hours
of employment and work requirements; (ii) procedures and practices relating to dis-
charge, suspension, lay-off, recall, seniority, and discipline, or to promotion, demotion,
transfer and assignment within the bargaining unit; (iii) conditions, procedures and prac-
tices governing safety, sanitation, and protection of health at the place of employment;
(iv) vacations and leaves of absence; and (v) administrative and procedural provisions
relating to the foregoing subjects. See Glenn, supra note 11, at 672.
18. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1947) (minority reports, re-
printed in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT, 1947, at 362. See generally Glenn, supra note 11, at 670.
19. The congressional bargaining objective is stated in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,
397 U.S. 99 (1970):
The object of this Act was . . . to ensure that employers and their employees
could work together to establish mutually satisfactory conditions. The basic
theme of the Act was that through collective bargaining the passions, argu-
ments and struggles of prior years would be channeled into constructive, open
discussions leading, it was hoped, to mutual agreement.
Id. at 103.
20. The NLRB, a tribunal provided for under the NLRA, is currently made up of
five members, each appointed by the President and serving five year terms. The Board is
responsible for the general administration of the Act and for policy regarding unfair
labor policy, union certification and determination of appropriate bargaining units. H.
ROBERT, supra note 5, at 274-75.
21. R. FELDAKER, LABOR GUIDE TO LABOR LAw 201 (2d ed. 1983).
22. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). See
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The NLRA explicitly makes "wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment" 23 mandatory subjects of bargaining. A
unilateral implementation of a new policy involving a mandatory
subject, without bargaining or consent, violates the statutory duty to
bargain under section 8(d) and 8(a)(5), and is subject to the Board's
remedial order.2
A mandatory subject requires that both parties bargain in good
faith. For management to act, it must notify the union, bargain over
the proposed change, and reach an impasse before it unilaterally
may implement the change .2  Furthermore, if a mandatory term al-
ready is contained in the collective bargaining agreement, modifica-
tion of the mandatory term cannot be accomplished even by bargain-
ing to impasse.2 6 There is, however, no obligation to agree, only to
bargain. 27 If impasse occurs, both sides have their traditional reme-
dies - strike or lock-out - to secure their respective aims.28
Mandatory subjects of bargaining are fluid. The NLRA does not
fix a list of subjects for mandatory bargaining; rather, it establishes
guidelines by which topics must be measured. Generally, mandatory
topics include only those issues which involve some aspect of the re-
lationship between employer and employee.2 If a subject is merely
permissive, neither party can insist on bargaining.30 Moreover, a uni-
lateral modification of a permissive bargaining subject, even if con-
tained in the contract, is not an unfair labor practice.3 1 Other reme-
generally Weckstein, The Problematic Provision and Protection of Health and Welfare
Benefits for Retirees, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 101 (1987), in this issue.
23. NLRA § 8(a)(5), (b)(3), (d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1982).
24. Id.
25. Id.; see Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1973), enforced,
505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974).
26. The Court has analyzed section 8(a)(5) and 8(d) and has concluded:
Read together, these provisions establish the obligation of the representative of
its employees to bargain with each other in good faith with respect to wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment .... The duty is limited
to those subjects, and within that area neither party is legally obligated to yield
.... As to other matters, however, each party is free to bargain or not to
bargain, and to agree or not to agree.
Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982); Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co., 207 N.L.R.B.
1063 (1973), enforced, 505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974).
28. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 824 (1962).
29. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 183-88 (1971); see also Comment, supra note 4, at
1007-09.
30. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349.
31. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 185-86 (1971). The Court indicated that section 8(d)
dies exist for such a breach.3 2 The traditional economic weapons of
the strike or lock-out are denied when the topic is merely
permissive.33
Labeling a subject as permissive rather than mandatory has seri-
ous ramifications. For example, in First National Maintenance Corp.
v. NLRB,34 the Supreme Court noted that "[]abeling [the partial
closing of a plant as mandatory or permissive] could afford the union
a powerful tool for achieving delay, a power that might be used to
thwart management's intentions in a manner unrelated to any feasi-
ble solution the union might propose."3 5 The Court further noted the
dilatory effect of alleging an unfair labor practice 38 which may af-
ford remedial relief apart from the parties' decisionmaking process.
Since one may not insist upon bargaining over a permissive subject,
a subject's characterization as mandatory or permissive can have
far-reaching effects.
Plant Closings
Courts seldom have considered the mandatory nature of decisional
bargaining in cases concerning plant closings.37 Several NLRB pro-
nouncements,38 however, have discussed this issue,39 and in NLRB v.
defined the duty to bargain only in respect to mandatory terms, and also limited to
mandatory terms the proscription against unilateral modification during the collective
bargaining term. Thus, a unilateral modification of a permissive topic contained in the
contract is not an 8(d) violation. The available remedy is a breach of contract action
under section 301 of the Act.
32. The statutory remedy for the aggrieved party is to institute a breach of con-
tract action under section 301 of the LMRA. Section 301 allows suits for the violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization to be brought in any district
court of the United States 'having jurisdiction, without regard to either the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties. LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
33. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
34. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
35. Id. at 667.
36. Id. An employer commits an "unfair labor practice" by "refusing to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees." This duty strengthens the much
broader right of workers to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing. The 1935 Senate report insisted that an employee's right to bargain collectively
would be "mere delusion" absent a correlative affirmative duty on the employer's part. S.
REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 2300, 2312.
37. Often, the characterization of a subject as mandatory or permissive arises in
the context of mid-contract relocation.
38. University of Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1974); Los Angeles
Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978); Boeing Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 696 (1977),
enforcement denied, 581 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1978).
39. The cases are not entirely consistent. The NLRB and courts have often
looked to employer motivation. Some results are due to detected anti-union animus. After
Fibreboard, the Board usually required bargaining over plant relocation. See Otis Eleva-
tor (Otis Elevator I), 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981); Armour Oil Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 1104,
1121 (1981); Ohio Brake & Clutch Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 35 (1979); see also Glenn,
supra note 11, at 680-81.
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Borg-Warner CorpA0 the Court affirmed the Board's division of top-
ics between mandatory and permissive but failed to suggest a meth-
odology for determining which topics would be mandatory under the
"terms and other conditions of employment" language. However, the
Court maintains the position that an employer has the right to close
a business completely, for any reason other than to chill unionization
elsewhere, and that such closure is exempt from NLRB intervention
so long as the closure is final.
41
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,'2 the Court ad-
dressed mandatory bargaining in the 8(d) context of "other condi-
tions of employment," and seemed to settle on a definitional ap-
proach. In Fibreboard, the employer subcontracted out work
previously done by bargaining unit employees. The employer antici-
pated "substantial savings" by using nonunion labor. The Court rea-
soned that "terms and conditions" covers subcontracting situations
which lead to work termination; thus, this subcontracting situation
was a mandatory subject of bargaining.4
The key to Fibreboard is that ongoing work was taken away from
bargaining unit employees and given to cheaper nonunion workers.
The Fibreboard majority, as in Borg-Warner, continued to utilize a
definitional approach. This approach asserted that subcontracting
was "plainly" a "condition of employment" because termination
could result." The utility of the definitional approach is questionable
since the vague phrase "condition of employment" 45 eludes exact
definition.
Justice Stewart concurred in Fibreboard and drafted guidelines to
40. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
41. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263
(1965).
42. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
43. Id. at 215. The Court stressed that the holding was to be applied narrowly,
that is, only to situations involving the subcontracting out of work previously done by
bargaining unit employees.
44. Id. at 210.
45. Id. It is interesting to note the dynamic tension between preservation of bar-
gaining unit work, clearly a mandatory subject of bargaining, and partial plant shut-
down, apparently permissive. The basic premise is that subcontracting is to be resolved at
the bargaining table. See Gould, supra note 6, at 62-63.
The anomaly is thus created that a union can strike over preserving bargaining unit
work in a subcontracting situation since it is mandatory but cannot strike over partial
shutdown. Therefore, if a collective bargaining agreement clause states: "there will be no
closing during the life of the contract," there can be no strike for a breach since it is
permissive. However, if the clause said "work cannot be subcontracted out or transferred
during the life of the contract," there is a mandatory obligation to bargain with the
attendant right to strike.
identify mandatory bargaining subjects under section 8(d) of the
NLRA, suggesting a three-part categorization of management deci-
sions which would trigger an obligation to bargain. 48 In the first cat-
egory, decisions mandate bargaining when they directly concern
"physical dimensions of [the] working environment. 47 The second
category includes decisions with marginal or indirect impact on the
employees. These do not mandate bargaining. The third category in-
cludes management decisions which directly affect employees by
eliminating jobs but which also involve the "core of entrepreneurial
control,' 48 and therefore cannot be mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing. Justice Stewart's Fibreboard concurrence provides a standard
by which the plant relocation issue can be analyzed.
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB
Since Fibreboard, courts have looked to Justice Stewart's pro-
posed categorization for guidance. In First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB,49 the Court adopted Justice Stewart's three-part
management decision scheme. First National Maintenance involved
an employer's duty to bargain over a decision to close part of his
business. The Court placed this management decision in Justice
Stewart's third category, concluding that it involved "the core of en-
trepreneurial control." 50
Nevertheless, the Court expanded Justice Stewart's guidelines by
adding a balancing test to determine the extent of an employer's
duty to bargain. According to this test, an employer is compelled to
bargain over management decisions which have a substantial impact
on continued availability of employment only if the benefit to labor-
management relations outweighs the burden placed on business oper-
ations. Applying this balancing test, the Court determined that the
employer's need to shut down part of a plant for economic reasons
outweighed any benefit gained by union participation in the decision.
Therefore, in this case, no bargaining was required regarding the
partial closure decision. 51
46. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring); see also Gould, supra note 6, at 62.
47. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 222.
48. Id. at 223. Decisions in the last category include production decisions, capital
investment decisions, and decisions regarding changes in the scope of the employer's op-
erations. Id. at 225. Justice Stewart indicated that these decisions do not involve employ-
ment conditions even though they could result in the termination of an employee's job.
Therefore, he concluded that decisions "fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate
enterprise" are not mandatory subjects of bargaining under sections 8(a)(5) or 8(d). Id.
49. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
50. Id. at 676.
51. Id. at 686. The decision left undisturbed the long-settled obligation to bargain
over the effects of a shutdown. E.g., Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380
U.S. 263 (1965).
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First National Maintenance reversed a lower court ruling which
created a presumption that partial plant closings involved a
mandatory duty to bargain decision.52 Several circuits had found
that partial closures were within the exclusive realm of en-
trepreneurial decisionmaking, creating no bargaining obligation.5"
The Second and Third Circuits, 54 however, created managerial limi-
tations on partial closings. These courts enforced a rebuttable pre-
sumption that such a closure demanded bargaining. The presump-
tion that the plant closure decision was a mandatory subject of
bargaining could be overcome by showing that the employer's inter-
ests outweighed that of the union. 55
The Supreme Court rejected this analysis of favoring a presump-
tive mandatory bargaining obligation; expressing concern that the
test was imprecise and would expose the employer unnecessarily to
back pay liability. The Court asserted that the intent of the NLRA
was not furthered by presuming mandatory bargaining. The First
National Maintenance balancing test gives sufficient priority to the
employer's need to exercise unencumbered decisionmaking in the
management of his business, while at the same time, affording
worker protection.
The Court concluded that a decision to close down part of a busi-
ness was not covered under the section 8(d) "other terms and condi-
tions of employment phrase. ' 57 However, the Court restricted this
holding to economically motivated partial closures and carefully ex-
pressed no view regarding application to plant relocations.58
52. Id. at 687; see also R. FELDAKER, supra note 21, at 190-91. It has long been
settled that an employer must bargain with employees as to how closure will be effected
and how benefits or severance will be handled. The controversy is over whether labor has
a statutorily guaranteed right to bargain over the decision to relocate.
53. NLRB v. Adams Dairy, 350 F.2d 108, 113 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1011 (1966); see also Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030, 1039 (8th
Cir. 1976) (dicta); NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698, 703 (10th Cir.
1969); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 1967);
NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965).
54. ABC Trans-National Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1981);
Equitable Gas v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1981); Electrical Prod. Div. of Midland
Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); Brock-
way Motor Trucks, Div. of Mack Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978).
55. See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 671.
56. Id. at 684.
57. Id. at 686.
58. Id. at n.22. First National Maintenance defers greatly to management needs.
The Court noted:
[M]anagement may have great need for speed, flexibility, and secrecy in meet-
ing business opportunities and exigencies. It may face significant tax or securi-
NLRB Response
The NLRB, relying on the narrowness of the First National
Maintenance holding, tended to mandate bargaining of plant reloca-
tion decisions regardless of the employer's motivation. 9 However, in
Otis Elevator 11,0 the NLRB attempted to apply the First National
Maintenance balancing test. Otis Elevator II involved a management
decision to consolidate facilities which were inefficient due to dupli-
cative work and outmoded technology. On remand, the Board ac-
knowledged that the First National Maintenance balancing test ap-
plied to facts such as those found in Otis. The Board simply
reasoned that as long as management's decision did not consider la-
bor costs, NLRA section 8(d) did not apply,"1 and the decision did
not require mandatory bargaining.
THE Milwaukee Spring DECISIONS
The principles relating to decision bargaining with respect to plant
relocation were once again argued and reviewed in the Milwaukee
Spring decisions.62 The case, reviewed twice by the NLRB and once
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, scrutinized the issue
from several perspectives. Each hearing emphasized different philos-
ophies and approaches. All, however, preferred contract clause anal-
ysis, and in dealing with decision bargaining, avoided the more diffi-
cult and subjective test enunciated in First National Maintenance.
In January 1982, the Illinois Coil Spring Company 3 asked the
United Auto Workers to forego a scheduled pay raise for the Mil-
ties consequences that hinge on confidentiality, the timing of a plant closing, or
a reorganization of the corporate structure. The publicity incident to the nor-
mal process of bargaining may injure the possibility of a successful transition
or increase the economic damage to the business. The employer may also have
no feasible alternative to the closing, and even good faith bargaining over it
may be both futile and cause the employer additional loss.
Id. at 682-83.
59. Glenn, supra note 11, at 681-82.
60. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
61. Id. at 893. This seems to substitute an "either-or" approach not entirely con-
sistent with the full balancing test seemingly required by First National Maintenance.
Moreover, Board members did not attempt to define all the balancing elements and apply
them to the facts of the case. Glenn, supra note 11, at 691.
62. Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. No. 206 (1982); Milwaukee Spring 11,
268 N.L.R.B. No. 601 (1984); United Auto Workers v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
63. The Illinois Coil Spring Company included three divisions: Holly Spring, Mc-
Henry Spring and Milwaukee Spring. The Milwaukee Spring workers were represented
by the International Union, the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America (United Auto Workers) and its Local 524. The employer and
the union had enjoyed a 20 year bargaining history; the most recent of several collective
bargaining agreements was to cover April 1980 through March 1983. Milwaukee Spring
1, 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982).
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waukee Spring employees and grant other contract concessions." In
March 1982, after the loss of a major contract and suffering from
other economic setbacks, 65 the company proposed relocating its as-
sembly operation to the nonunionized McHenry Spring facility. The
labor costs at McHenry were substantially lower.6" No dispute ever
existed as to the employer's motivation in considering relocation: the
decision was due solely to the higher labor costs at the unionized
facility. The decision was economically motivated and without anti-
union animus.67 The employer did not contend that it was unable to
pay the contractual wage rates; rather, it was concerned with an in-
adequate return on its investment.6 8 After discussion,69 the union
membership rejected any further consideration of labor contract con-
64. Id. at 207.
65. Illinois Coil Spring had lost a major contract with Fisher Body which resulted
in a $2000 per month revenue decline. An employer who thus urges economic necessity
for midterm wage and benefit concessions may trigger a section 8(a)(5) duty to substan-
tiate its claims by offering verifying records. See NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co.,
351 U.S. 149 (1956), in which the court held:
Good faith bargaining requires that claims made by either bargainer should be
honest claims. This is true about an asserted inability to pay an increase in
wages. If such an argument is important enough to present in the give and take
of bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its
accuracy.
Id. at 152-53. In practice, knowledgeable negotiators avoid triggering the Truitt duty to
disclose financial records.
66. Approximately 35 of the 95 unionized employees worked in the Milwaukee
Spring assembly operation. The McHenry facility was not unionized, and the pay at that
facility was substantially lower. The McHenry wage was $4.50; the fringe benefit was
$1.35 ($5.85 total). The Milwaukee Spring wage was $8.00; the fringe benefit was $2.00
($10.00 total). Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 207.
67. It is well-settled that a decision motivated by anti-union animus violates
NLRA section 8(a)(3). Anti-union animus is defined as anti-union interest. Only if an
employer decides to close his entire business permanently will his anti-union motivation
be irrelevant. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
68. Employers have always been held to have the right to make certain manage-
rial decisions unilaterally. The decision to close a business belongs to the owner; the free-
market system does not allow forcing a business person to remain open when the owner
wishes, for whatever reason, to permanently close. Id.
69. The company informed the United Auto Workers that further concessions
were needed to keep the molding operations economically viable. The employer expressed
continued willingness to discuss assembly relocation alternatives. The union voted against
accepting a revised wage scale which was identical to the much lower MeHenry wage
and benefit structure (a pay reduction of over 40 percent), but indicated a willingness to
continue discussions.
Two days later, the company presented the union with a comprehensive proposal enti-
tled "Terms Upon Which Milwaukee Assembly Operations Will be Retained In Milwau-
kee." The union and the company discussed the proposal item-by-item. When the union
asked if this was the employer's final offer, the company replied that these proposals
came close to the lowest levels that it would accept, but that this would not foreclose
further bargaining with the union. Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 206-07.
cessions. 70 Subsequently, the employer announced plans to relocate
its assembly operation from Milwaukee Spring to the McHenry
plant. 1
Milwaukee Spring I
Milwaukee Spring I arose when the United Auto Workers filed an
unfair labor practice charge against the Milwaukee Spring Division
of the Illinois Coil Spring Company (Milwaukee Spring), charging
them with violating sections 8(d) and 8(a)(1), (3) and (5). The case
was submitted to the Board on stipulated facts, and the Board ma-
jority treated the parties' stipulation as proof that the plant reloca-
tion decision was a mandatory subject. The Board held that based
upon the company's behavior, it had a duty to bargain. Such a duty
could arise only if the subject was mandatory. Using this circular
reasoning, the Board found the test enunciated in First National
Maintenance inapplicable, concluding that the issue of mandatori-
ness had already been decided.72
The NLRB in Milwaukee Spring I focused instead on the require-
ments which attend midterm modifications. The collective bargain-
ing agreement at issue in Milwaukee Spring I contained both a rec-
ognition clause 3 and a management rights clause. In construing
these clauses, the Board followed the logic of the Los Angeles
Marine5 case, an earlier decision of the Board. In that case, an em-
ployer relocated a portion of its business during the pendency of a
collective bargaining agreement. The Board found that despite legiti-
mate employer financial problems, the relocation, absent union con-
sent, was in violation of sections 8(d), and 8(a)(1) and (5). The de-
sire to obtain economic relief from a collective bargaining agreement
was not excused by either subjective good faith or by economic ne-
70. Id. at 207.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 210.
73. A recognition clause is a standard part of a formalized collective bargaining
agreement and identifies the bargaining union, and the contract's coverage of specified
employee jobs. Some Boards or courts have found this liberal reading "seriously impinges
upon the fundamental rights of management and requires reversal." See University of
Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 942, 944 (7th Cir. 1975). Disagreeing with the Milwaukee
Spring I Board, the Board in Milwaukee Spring II declined to read jurisdictional rights
into the clause.
74. An employer will bargain vigorously for a management rights clause. This
clause, depending on its scope, may give the employer almost unlimited ability to make
changes. Since it has been bargained for, a court which closely heeds its express language
will determine the union has conceded employer authority to make decisions or changes.
The management rights clause in the Milwaukee Spring case was very extensive, as em-
phasized by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
75. Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602
F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979).
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cessity.76 Thus, the Milwaukee Spring I Board adopted the following
Los Angeles Marine standard. Even though there was: 1) a proven
economic problem; 2) no anti-union animus; and 3) the company had
bargained over the decision and stood willing to bargain over the
effects, a move based solely on economic relief which modified an
existing collective bargaining agreement would violate the Act unless
the Union had waived its statutory right to object to the
modification."
The Board then looked to the various clauses in the collective bar-
gaining agreement to find the union consent or waiver necessary to
justify their midterm relocation decision.78 Citing Los Angeles
Marine, the Board dismissed Milwaukee Spring's contention that the
contract's preamble 9 or anything else in the agreement constituted a
clear and unequivocal union waiver of its right to object to a
midterm contract modification. 0 The Board next examined the man-
agement rights clause and determined that since it did not expressly
grant the employer relocation rights, the clause did not adequately
provide for union consent.81
The Board was unable to find consent or union waiver based on
the collective bargaining agreement or in the Union's agreement to
meet with the employer over the relocation. 2 The Board ordered the
Illinois Spring Coil Company to rescind its relocation decision and to
restore the status quo ante by restoring any lost jobs to the Milwau-
kee facility. Further, the Board ordered the company to reinstate
with back pay any employee laid off by reason of the proscribed
76. Id. at 735.
77. Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 209; see also Los Angeles Marine, 235
N.L.R.B. at 735.
78. Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 209; see also Irving, Plant Relocations
and Transfers of Work: The NLRBs 'Inherently Destructive' Approach, 34 LAB. L.J.
549 (1983) (a pro-management discussion of the use of both the waiver and inherently
destructive doctrines).
79. The company argued that the preamble of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and the management rights clause waived any right the union had to object to the
transfer. The Board disagreed, asserting that the collective bargaining agreement did not
clearly and unequivocally waive the union's statutory right to object to the company's
action. Milwaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 209-10.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. The Board was unwilling to read into the recognition clause anything other
than an intent to describe the physical plant location at the time the agreement was
negotiated. Id.; accord NLRB v. Marine Optical Inc., 671 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1982);
see also University of Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 942, 944 (7th Cir. 1975). Nor did
they interpret the recognition clause as limiting the application of the agreement to that
location. Milwaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 209 n.4.
transfer.83 Based on this ruling, it appeared that plant relocation
would be a mandatory subject of bargaining in future disputes.
Milwaukee Spring II
In Milwaukee Spring 11,8" the Board reversed itself and dismissed
the complaint against the employer.8 5 As in Milwaukee Spring I, the
Milwaukee Spring II Board did not apply the Supreme Court test
enunciated in First National Maintenance.86 By avoiding the First
National Maintenance test, the Board did not have to apply the vari-
ous balancing factors to determine if the relocation decision required
mandatory bargaining.87
The Milwaukee Spring II Board dismissed any further inquiry
into mandatory bargaining requirements, focusing instead on con-
tract principles. It reasoned that the result in Milwaukee Spring I
must have been due to a specific contractual provision which had
been violated by the company relocation. Since the specific term was
not identified in the earlier ruling, the Board undertook an indepen-
dent review of the collective bargaining agreement to search for such
a provision.88 The Board was unable to find a provision in the con-
tract which it felt had been violated.89
The Board noted that parties often negotiate for specific contrac-
tual language which will govern work relocation, subcontracting, and
work preservation.9" Absent a finding that the parties negotiated
83. Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 210-11. The back pay remedy attempts
to make employees whole for any loss subscribable to an employer's unfair labor practice
by paying them an amount equal to the amount that they would have earned from the
date of the layoff to the date of the employer's recall, less net earnings, but with interest.
See F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950); Florida Steel Corp., 231 N.L.R.B.
651 (1977). See generally ISIS Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 716 (1962). As
for reinstatement, if the former positions no longer exist, the employees are entitled to
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other privi-
leges. Id. at 211.
84. Milwaukee Spring I1, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984).
85. Id.
86. See Milwaukee Spring I1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 601 n.5.
87. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
88. Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. at 602.
89. Id. The Milwaukee Spring II Board rejected the union argument that the
wage and benefit provision had been modified, reasoning that the clause only represented
an agreement to compensate the employees at a given rate. In his dissent, Member Zim-
merman found this reasoning "disingenuous" since there would be no employees left to
receive wages. Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. at 611 (Zimmerman, dissenting).
The Board also rejected any reading of either the recognition clause or the wage and
benefit clause as guaranteeing work preservation.
The Board expressly recognized that parties could draft work preservation clauses and
that such clauses were commonplace in collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 602.
However, the Board contended that to imply such clauses would be "revolutionary" and
would come as a surprise to those parties who had previously felt the need to bargain for
or against their explicit inclusion. Id. at 604 n.13.
90. In so holding, the Board overruled its prior holdings in Boeing Co., 230
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those protections, the Board contended that Milwaukee Spring I was
a radical departure from traditional collective bargaining and dis-
agreed with General Counsel's oral argument that the previous re-
sult was consistent with the course and history of collective
bargaining. 9
The Board cited the standard enunciated by the reviewing appeals
court in University of Chicago,92 which permits an employer to
transfer work out of a bargaining unit if the employer bargains in
good faith to impasse and is not motivated by anti-union animus.
The Board concluded that Milwaukee Spring I had the effect of ad-
ding terms to the collective bargaining agreement which the parties
had never agreed upon, and believed its decision to reverse Milwau-
kee Spring I and to follow the University of Chicago standard fos-
tered a more open and vigorous collective bargaining process.
93
The lone dissenter, former President Carter appointee Zimmer-
man, focused upon whether the relocation decision was a mandatory
subject for bargaining. He concluded that absent consent, relocation
during a collective bargaining term violated NLRA section 
8(d) .94
Zimmerman utilized a two-step analysis which he concluded was
necessary for the resolution of any plant relocation case. First, the
threshold decision was whether relocation was a mandatory subject
of bargaining.9 5 Second, it is necessary to decide if section 8(d) al-
lowed an employer to relocate after a midterm bargaining impasse.
Applying at least part of the First National Maintenance test es-
chewed by the majority, Zimmerman found relocation to be "amena-
ble" to resolution through bargaining and thus mandatory.
96
Zimmerman stressed that he would restrict section 8(d) violations
involving mandatory subjects to instances where evasion of a con-
tract term is the sole or predominant employer motivation.
9 7 The
facts underlying the Milwaukee Spring dispute fit squarely within
this prohibited category. Zimmerman found the employer's motiva-
tion due solely to a desire to acquire a better financial return by
substituting cheaper nonunion labor for the higher union wage rates
N.L.R.B. 696 (1977), enforcement denied, 581 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1978); University of
Chicago, 210 N.L.R.B. 190 (1974), enforcement denied, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975).
91. Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 603.
92. 210 N.L.R.B. 190 (1974), enforcement denied, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975).
93. Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 604.
94. Id. at 612.
95. Id. at 605.
96. Id. at 608.
97. Id. at 605.
to which the employer was contractually bound.98 Zimmerman found
the employer had derogated his bargaining obligation, thereby vio-
lating section 8(d) because the employer was economically motivated
and had acted to avoid a contractual term.
Zimmerman concluded that the Milwaukee Spring I approach
and his dissent were closer to NLRA intent, disagreeing that this
result would encourage employer deception. Rather, he emphasized
the strong incentive to avoid industrial disruption through meaning-
ful bargaining.
Milwaukee Spring III
The approach of the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit was markedly different from the two earlier decisions. In
Milwaukee Spring III,91 Judge Harry T. Edwards, a recognized la-
bor expert, employed a combination of strict contract construction
and duty to bargain principles and concluded that Milwaukee Spring
had a contractual right to relocate, either because of an extensive
bargained for management rights clause or because such rights can
be inferred from the management reserved rights theory.100 There-
fore, he concluded Milwaukee Spring had not violated section
8(d). 101
Judge Edwards first surveyed general duty to bargain principles.
Labor and management generally have a continuing duty to bargain
over mandatory subjects even after reaching a collective bargaining
agreement. However, the bargaining duty's scope varies depending
on whether or not the subject is "contained in" the contract.10 2 If a
mandatory subject is "contained in" the contract, either through ex-
press reference (for example, a wage provision) or a general waiver
of the duty to bargain (for example, a zipper clause), the employer's
actions are considerably restrained by section 8(d) requirements.
Neither party can require the other to bargain and unilateral change
98. Id. at 611.
99. United Auto Workers v. NLRB (Milwaukee Spring, intervenor), 765 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Milwaukee Spring III]. Judge Edwards, author of the
opinion has written a text and numerous articles concerning arbitration and its advan-
tages over the NLRB and court proceedings. See, e.g., Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration
and Waiver of Duty to Bargain: A Possible Way Out of Everlasting Confusion at the
NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 23 (1985). Arbitration is the highly favored method of resolving
industrial disputes. Among its praiseworthy attributes are relative speed, lack of expense
and almost total freedom from judicial review.
100. The court identified the reserved management rights theory as the "com-
monly endorsed theory of labor relations [holding] that management retains all rights
preexisting the contract that the union does not expressly extract from management in a
specific clause." The court expressed no view as to the legitimacy of this theory. Milwau-
kee Spring I1, 765 F.2d at 182 n.29.
101. Id. at 183.
102. Id. at 179.
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is forbidden, even after impasse.1"3
Because the Milwaukee Spring contract contained a zipper
clause,104 Edwards assumed all the subjects, even those never con-
templated nor discussed, were "contained in" the contract and sub-
ject to the section 8(d) requirements. Thus, no bargaining was re-
quired and unilateral action would be prohibited, even after impasse.
However, the contract contained another clause which changed
the outcome. The company bargained for an extensive management
rights clause.10 5 Milwaukee Spring contended that the union, in
agreeing to the clause, "unequivocally waived" their bargaining right
as to relocation.
The union did not contest this interpretation on appeal nor did
they urge that the company violated the zipper clause by taking uni-
lateral action. Therefore, the court concluded that the union had
made a "tacit concession"106 that the company had a cdntractual
right to relocate.
Because no impermissible modification of a contract term had oc-
curred and no anti-union animus existed, section 8(d) had not been
violated. The court rejected any notion that an aggregate of com-
plaints (midterm concessions and the relocation decision) are any
more violative of section 8(d) than any one complaint alone.
10 7 Also,
the court rejected the idea that "economic pressure" is violative of
8(d).
The court concluded with the idea that the common practice of
offering to exchange an existing contract right for midterm modifica-
103. Id. at 180.
104. Id. at 182. Zipper clauses have not been given great effect in past NLRB
decisions; however, the NLRB has announced that it does intend to give more weight 
to
zipper clauses and to management rights clauses in the future.
105. The management rights clause reads as follows:
Except as expressly limited by the other Articles of this Agreement, the Com-
pany shall have the exclusive right to manage the plant and business and 
direct
the working forces.
These rights include, but are not limited to, the right to plan, direct and
control operations, to determine the operations or services to be performed in 
or
at the plant or by the employees of the Company, to establish and maintain
production and quality standards, to schedule the working hours, to hire, 
pro-
mote, demote, and transfer, to suspend, discipline or discharge for just cause 
or
to relieve employees because of lack of work or for other legitimate 
reasons, to
introduce new and improved methods, materials or facilities, or to change 
ex-
isting methods, materials or facilities.
Milwaukee Spring III, 765 F.2d at 182 n.24.
106. Id. at 182.
107. Id. at 183.
tion promotes freedom and flexibility in labor relations. 0
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
The Milwaukee Spring cases simply do not resolve the plant relo-cation issue. Milwaukee Spring III specifically avoided the issue ofwhether plant relocation is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Be-cause the parties had failed to avail themselves of their arbitrationremedies, the court concluded its role was limited to a strict readingof the contract clauses as expressed in the collective bargaining
agreement.109 The Milwaukee Spring III court did not imply rightsinto existing clauses, as had the Milwaukee Spring I Board, but itdid give effect to management rights and zipper clauses which ear-
lier rulings had ignored as boilerplate.
The court, besides relying heavily on these clauses, equated theunion's silence about the employer's management rights clause asboth a waiver of a "mandatory" bargaining subject and an accept-ance of an implied right under the contract."10 It is unlikely that alabor decision not to respond to an opponent's "unequivocal waiver"argument means they have agreed that the company has a contrac-
tual right to relocate. In addition, zipper clauses might be said tooperate against waiver since they mean the parties are under no fur-ther bargaining obligation. The court's approach can be seen as en-couraging the constant flux rejected in Taft-Hartley."' Giving somuch effect to these types of contract clauses does not seem to effec-tuate the substantive heart of a collective bargaining agreement.
Overemphasis on a management rights theory can be used to se-verely restrict labor's rights, particularly if tied to a zipper clause.Conversely, the labeling of a seemingly legal practice as "inherently
destructive",112 or a staunch unwillingness to find waiver, may place
too onerous a burden on the employer.
Generally, the Board and courts should not interfere in the sub-stance of collective bargaining agreements. Reviewing authorities
may, however, intervene when the entire bargaining process is beingundermined as it surely is in the case of plant relocations.
The analysis of the mandatory and permissive dichotomy entails awide range of approaches, almost all of which were used or men-
tioned in the Milwaukee Spring cases. Although reaching different
108. Id. at 184.
109. This contractual approach has been criticized as undermining the prong ofthe NLRA which seeks to halt continuous bargaining. The critics contend that an em-ployer may not use work relocation as an economic weapon in mid-contract because itencourages the constant negotiations which so troubled the drafters of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments. See, e.g., Glenn, supra note 11, at 668.
110. Milwaukee Spring II, 765 F.2d at 182.
111. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
112. See Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 208.
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conclusions, the hearing bodies had the same goals: to remain true to
the intent of the NLRA and to stimulate a healthy and thriving la-
bor policy. The oft repeated purpose of the NLRA is to promote
industrial peace; 113 negotiation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment achieves this purpose.
Conceptually, plant relocation might certainly be a term or condi-
tion of employment "by virtue of its impact on employment." The
record proves otherwise. Scrutiny of legislative intent as well as re-
cent NLRB and court rulings, particularly the recent Supreme
Court First National Maintenance decision overturning a more in-
clusive approach, suggests that plant relocation will not be desig-
nated a per se mandatory bargaining subject.
" " In fact, this rigid
delineation is unnecessary in light of the First National Maintenance
decision itself. The test adopted by the Court balances a number of
factors even as the parties balance their own strengths and weak-
nesses. The test effectuates legislative intent because it attempts to
preserve the essence of the parties' own agreement.
When the Second and Third Circuits began to create managerial
limitations, the Supreme Court rejected this approach, finding it did
not further the intent of the NLRA, and reemphasized the impor-
tance of managerial autonomy.11 5 The Court emphasized manage-
ment's need for speed, flexibility, and secrecy. In First National
Maintenance, the Court crafted a benefit-burden test which requires
the weighing of various factors on a case-by-case basis. However, its
stated scope was narrow, leaving open many other types of possible
mandatory decisions, including plant relocation.
" 6
A logical approach in determining whether bargaining is man-
dated is to apply the First National Maintenance balancing test on a
case-by-case basis. The Board has not been anxious to use this test
and, in fact, ignored it until Otis Elevator I.
111
Criticism of the First National Maintenance test revolves around
the mutability of the factors. A simple definitive test to identify
mandatoriness is unlikely because the implicated disputes take place
in such a fluid arena. In fact, the Court eschews rigid doctrine which
mandates application across all industries, preferring that individual
industry custom control.1 8 The test factors are grounded in the real-




117. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
118. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-75 (1981). This
ity of the labor-employer relationship. The existence of multiple, mu-
table factors gives the Board or court a generous measure of
flexibility.
The negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement is a tough
process, reflecting the underlying labor-management relationship.
Boards or courts intervene only when tactics and practices threaten
to destroy the very fabric of the statutorily enforced procedures.
"Fairness" is not measured against a result which might make both
parties feel protected, but rather is achieved by allowing any result
the parties can implement or impose within certain legal parameters.
The NLRA foresees that parties will negotiate on any subject they
wish to gain protection for, but is adamant that neither party must
agree or concede.119 This negotiating process operates squarely
within the context of economic realities.
The original approach taken by Congress was to recognize the dy-
namic tension and forego delineation of iron-clad rules. 120 Apart
from the basic structure, a per se approach to the plant relocation
issue is inconsistent with the fluid, ever-changing collective bargain-
ing process. The labor-management relationship reflects general eco-
nomic trends. The "balance" has swung any number of times from
management to labor and back again. Nonetheless, it has proven dif-
ficult for the various reviewing bodies to restrict their scrutiny to the
procedure and refrain from influencing substantive matters, even
though there is no dispute that statutorily these matters of substance
belong exclusively to the bargaining parties.121
Current decisions and the makeup of the NLRB strongly suggest
that it is unlikely that plant relocation will be assumed to require
mandatory decisional bargaining. The stated philosophy will be to
leave the greatest discretion to the parties, so long as no anti-union
animus is apparent.1 22 However, courts should confront the plant re-
location issue directly, and should apply the First National Mainte-
nance balancing test. Outcomes will not be absolutely predictable.
This very uncertainty may counsel against adjudication and force
policy can be seen in the minority report, reprinted in I NLRB. LEGISLATIV E HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 362 (1948). The report urged
that a formula would be a legislative "straightjacket." The scope of collective bargaining
would be better served by individual industry practice, and should generally be left first,
to employers and trade-unions, and second, to a skilled administrative agency. See also
supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
119. First Natal Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677.
120. Recent efforts failed to pass an AFL-CIO backed bill which would have re-
quired employers to give workers a 90-day notice before relocating a plant. The bill,strongly opposed by business groups was defeated by the House of Representatives in a
208-203 vote. The San Diego Tribune, Nov. 22, 1985, § AA at 1, col. 4.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
122. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1969); Mil-
waukee Spring II, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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these issues into the preferred industrial courtroom of arbitration.
1 3
The parties may find better incentives to clearly define their own
bargaining topics. This result mirrors the intent of the NLRA, which
encourages parties to arrive at their own agreements. The refusal to
delineate rigid categories of topics, some as mandatory, some as per-
missive, furthers the statutory intent. The sometimes conflicting pur-
poses of the NLRA coalesce, and the collective bargaining process is
enhanced through an insistence that parties make their own agree-
ments, influenced by the power and ability which each possesses at
that moment.
CONCLUSION
The legislative history of mandatory bargaining subjects reflects
that Congress always intended that, within each industry, the parties
would create their own guidelines in determining which subjects
mandated bargaining. The Supreme Court, in First National Main-
tenance, announced a test which the Board and courts should adopt
to determine whether plant relocation is a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining on a case-by-case basis.
The Milwaukee Spring trilogy illustrates that the Board and the
courts have been reluctant to use the First National Maintenance
test, apparently believing that contract interpretation overrides the
need to determine whether or not a plant relocation is a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Nevertheless, the consistent use of the flexible
First National Maintenance test as a threshold analysis would
achieve consistency, avoid needless litigation, and more fully inform
parties as to the extent of their bargaining obligations as case law
develops. The benefits-burden test might also curb the tendency of
Board rulings to reflect current political trends rather than stable
labor principles. As long as the Board or courts apply any one of a
number of approaches, which often start at different analytical levels
and may be grounded on different assumptions, confusion will con-
tinue. The real loser in this dilemma is the continued vitality of the
labor-management relationship. The relationship is constantly
changing. The participants deserve a foundation of logical and con-
sistent rulings so that they can predict and fulfill bargaining
responsibilities.
JOANNE D. ROAKE
123. See generally Edwards, supra note 99.

